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Abstract 
Since the fall of communism far-left parties have begun a long process of change, which has 
transformed their position in the European political systems. Indeed, far-left parties are now 
important actors in most of the E.U. However, they present different characteristics than in 
the past. Communist parties have almost disappeared from parliamentary arenas, and, in 
many countries, new forms of far-left parties have emerged (i.e. social-populist and populist-
socialist parties). The aim of this article is to describe the ideological framework of far-left 
parties in Europe. More specifically, it aims to examine both the demand-side and supply-
side factors on which scholars focused in the attempt to explain the birth of these parties and 
the interactions that led to the development of specific forms of far-left parties. This article 
concludes with an analysis of three national cases, namely Spain, Portugal and Italy. The 
three countries belong to a similar context characterised by a profound economic crisis. 
However, despite many common features, in the three cases different forms of far-left 
parties have developed. 
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Introduction 
 
Almost thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, far-left parties are a 
common presence in European political systems. Although the fall of 
communism has undermined the group of far-left parties, the so-called 
“retreating army”2 survived and progressively re-gained strength. After the 2007 
                                               
1  Matteo Boldrini is a PhD student in Social and Political change at the University of 
Florence. He received his Master’s degree from the University of Florence in 2014 and 
then won a scholarship for the “Silvano Tosi” seminar on parliamentary studies. His 
major research interests are related to the changing of political elites and political parties. 
His broader research interests include the evolution and the transformations of far-left 
parties in Europe (matteo.boldrini@unifi.it).   
2 The expression was coined by Marc Lazar, who said that far-left parties during the 1980s 
were looking like a “retreating army”. Marc Lazar, “Communism in Western Europe in 
the 1980s”, Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 4, 1988, pp. 243–257. 
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economic crisis, far-left parties have generally strengthened their presence on 
the European stage. As illustrated by March and Mudde,
3
 during the post-Soviet 
Union era, the far-left parties have radically changed their profile. Though they 
survived on local or extra parliamentary level, communist parties have almost 
disappeared from the national political arena and social populist parties have 
gained power in many of their former feuds.
4
 In the 2015 Spanish general 
election, Podemos became the third largest party, immediately after the 
historical People’s Party (PPE) and the Socialists (PSOE). Two years later, in 
the 2017 French presidential elections, the candidate of La France Insoumise, a 
newly created far-left party, has received only a few percentage points less than 
Emmanuel Macron, the elected president. However, despite their shared goal of 
opposing the usual way of doing politics and placing the topic of inclusion high 
on their agendas, contemporary far-left parties cannot be considered as a 
traditional party-family. Differences can be identified with regard to their 
origins, policy-agenda and, last but not least, ideology.  
On this ground, in these last years, scholars have demonstrated a 
renewed interest in studying the group of far-left parties. To wit, scholars have 
analysed the differences between parties and the determinants of their most 
recent electoral successes.
5
 In line with this renewed interest in the literature, 
this analysis aims to identify the makeup of the far-left group of parties by 
examining the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side. 
Demand-side explanations focus on those bottom-up pressures that facilitated 
the far left in mobilising electoral support, whereas supply-side explanations 
focus on the political opportunity structure in which these parties act. In 
addition, I propose an empirical-focused analysis based on three different 
national cases, treated as most similar cases. The focus on Spain, Portugal and 
Italy allows us to test the theoretically based observations and to use new 
insights in order uncover the mechanisms behind the electoral appeal of far left. 
Despite shared features with regard to economic, political and social arenas, 
while in Spain and Portugal far-left parties have reached electoral relevance in 
recent years, in Italy, they have remained on the fringe side, with significantly 
lower levels of consent.  
The analysis is organised as follows. In the first part, I examine the 
literature on far-left parties, their ideological framework and their electoral 
evolution since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The second part investigates how the 
demand side and supply side factors can be used as explicative elements for the 
                                               
3  Luke March and Cas Mudde, “What’s left of the radical left? The European radical left 
after 1989: Decline and mutation”, Comparative European Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, 2005, 
pp. 23–49. 
4  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe, Abingon, Routledge, 2011. 
5  Luke March and Charlotte Rommerskirchen, “Out of left field? Explaining the variable 
electoral success of European radical left parties” Party Politics, vol. 21, 2012, pp. 40 – 53. 
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success of the far-left parties. In the third section, the focus is on the importance 
of analysing the interaction between the supply-side and the demand-side. The 
fourth part presents the empirical analysis, while the final section concludes and 
discusses the general aspects of the analysis.  
 
 
The Definition of Far-Left Parties 
 
Defining what is the ideological framework of the far-left party family 
is not an easy task. It is not unusual to find the descriptive adjectives “radical”, 
“extremist”, “hard” or “transformative”6 used in reference to these parties. It is 
hence important, before discussing the nature of their ideological framework, to 
identify the use of the term “far-left.”7  
According to the literature, the group of far-left parties is divided into 
“radical left parties” and “extremist left parties”. Although the two attributes are 
sometimes used interchangeably, the literature lays emphasis on major 
differences between “radicalism” and “extremism.”8 Thus, while “radicalism” is 
defined as an orientation that demands radical changes in contemporary liberal-
democratic systems without placing itself outside the democratic consensus, 
“extremism” is used in reference to an opposition to the constitutional order and 
democracy itself.
9
 Drawing on Mudde’s analysis on the radical right 
populisms,
10
 Luke March further specifies that radicalism refers to a 
“radicalization of mainstream belief.”11 From this point of view, far-left 
“radical” parties are defined with regard to a shared endeavour towards a radical 
reform of capitalism and neo-liberal society, and the promotion of a radicalized 
version of the systemic left values (i.e. equality, integration, state intervention, 
etc.). On a similar vein, the sub-group of extremist radical left parties refer to 
those parties which include anti-democratic elements in both their rhetoric and 
their actions. Beyond the theoretical elements, it is however difficult to make a 
clear distinction between radical and extremist left parties when it comes to 
empirics. On the one hand, as March himself says, sometimes centre-left parties 
have voluntarily maintained a radical rhetoric. On the other hand, extremist far 
left parties often hide their anti-democratic purpose with a democratic twist (i.e. 
                                               
6  Richard Dunphy, Contesting Capitalism? Left Parties and European Integration, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004. 
7  Luke March, “Radical left in Europe” … cit., p. 1. 
8  Cas Mudde (eds.), “Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe”, London, 
Routledge, 2011. 
9  Ibidem. 
10  Cas Mudde, “The populist radical right: a pathological normalcy”, West European 
Politics, vol. 33, 2010, pp. 1167–1186. 
11  Idem, p. 1168. 
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emphasis on hyper-democracy).
12
 Thus, for the purpose of the current analysis, I 
acknowledge the difficulty in making an operational distinction between radical 
and extremist parties.
13
 Therefore, in my understanding, the use the term “far-
left” covers both “radical” and “extremist”. 
Having defined the concept of reference, it is now possible to focus on 
the distinctive traits and ideological features of the far left. As stated above, this 
is not an easy task either. Due to a tortuous historical evolution,
14
 the far-left 
party family exhibits a heterogeneous ideological profile. Note should be taken 
that with regard to the 20
th
 century, the most successful far-left parties were, 
with no doubt, the communist parties. In various forms and with different 
degrees of electoral success, these parties were present in almost all European 
countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantlement of the 
U.S.S.R., their position became more complicated. Thus, beyond the birth of 
new challengers, expressions of the so-called “New Left”, several communist 
parties changed their names and their political identity. Some of them moved 
towards the centre of the political spectrum and openly became centre-left 
parties. It is the case of the Italian Communist Party. Others changed their name 
and accepted their new political position by advocating for new issues such as 
ecology or feminism. It is the case of the German Die Linke. Others, while 
maintaining the communist identity, accepted on their agenda stances endorsed 
by new social actors (i.e. anti-globalization and civil rights movements).
15
 In 
addition, far-left parties exhibit a great variability of stances on economic 
aspects. In this context it is hard to define a common ideological framework. 
In the past years scholars concentrated their attention mostly on 
communist and post-communist parties.
16
 After the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
literature focused the attention on the complex changes made by the far-left. In 
                                               
12  Luke March, Radical left in Europe … cit., p. 11. 
13  Cas Mudde, “The war of words: Defining the extreme right party family”, West European 
Politics, vol. 19, 1996, pp.  225–248, Cas Mudde, “Anti-system politics” in Paul M. 
Heywood, Erik Jones, Martin Rhodes and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), Developments in 
European Politics, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006, pp. 178–195. 
14  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit., p. 11. 
15  In his volume Radical left parties in Europe, Luke March identifies six different strategies 
applied by communist parties after the Fall of Berlin Wall. Several parties renamed and 
reorganised their identity as non-communist far-left parties. Others transformed into 
social democratic parties. Especially in the Eastern Europe, different parties became 
socialist populist parties with a nationalist twist. Other parties diluted their ideology in 
electoral coalitions with a broad democratic or socialist orientation. A fifth group refers to 
those parties that dissolved themselves into coalition of various ideologies. The sixth 
group refers to those parties that maintained their name and their ideology. For more 
details see Luke March, Radical left in Europe … cit., pp. 44-45. 
16  Joan Botella and Luis Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change: The 
Evolution of West European Communist and Post-Communist Parties, Barcelona, Institut 
de Ciències Politiques i Socials, 2003. 
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this context, Backes and Moreau
17
 made a classification of far-left parties based 
on their origins. They distinguish between (1) traditional communist parties, 
those who conserved their communist identity, (2) reformed communist parties, 
those who remained faithful to the Communist’s orthodoxy, and (3) “new left” 
or “red-green” parties, a category that includes non-communist parties, with an 
agenda focused on supports typical new left issues (i.e. ecology, gender equality 
and minority rights). However, a classification based on party origins tend to 
underestimate the effects of party change over time, changes that may lead to 
very different types of far-left.
18
 Despite this difficulty, within the literature, 
several scholars have tried to classify the group of far-left parties with regard to 
their ideology.
19
 This line of analysis is illustrated by the distinction between 
traditional Communist parties and the New Left.
20
 On a similar ground 
proceeded Escalona and Vieira. Drawing on Botella and Ramiro,
21
 the two 
scholars delineate a typology of the far-left by taking into account (1) the 
relationship between the party identity and the communist identity and (2) the 
political space occupied by the party at a national level. On this basis, Escalona 
and Vieira identified four different types of far-left parties: the orthodox 
communists, the social democratic left, the red-green left and the revolutionary 
left. This typology applies exclusively to Western Europe, as knowledge by the 
two scholars themselves. It has limited heuristic capacity when applied to recent 
phenomena such as Podemos and France Insoumise. 
More recently, in his work on radical left parties, March
22
 made a 
distinction based on the parties’ ideological framework. He identified four 
groups: far-left parties, communist, democratic socialist, social populist and 
populist socialist. Despite weaknesses due to overlapping between radicalism 
and extremism, this classification provides important innovative aspects. 
According to March, the communists refer to those parties which openly refer to 
the “traditional” ideological framework of the communist movements. It is an 
extremely heterogeneous group composed for the most part by tiny 
revolutionary niche parties, “conservative” communists and “reform” 
communist parties. According to March, the “conservative” communists differ 
from the group of the “reformed” ones with regard to their adherence to the 
                                               
17  Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau (eds.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties in 
Europe, Göttingen, Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 2008. 
18  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit. 
19  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit., Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and 
Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties and 
Governments, Boston, McGraw Hill, 2005. 
20  Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern 
Europe: Institutions, Parties and Governments … cit. 
21  Fabien Escalona and Mathieu Vieira, “The Radical Left in Europe: Thoughts About the 
Emergence of a Family”, Fondation Jean-Jaurès / Observatoire de la vie politique, 19 
November 2013, p. 1. 
22  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit., pp. 94-98. 
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Soviet model and the degree of openness to the New Left agenda.
23
 
Conservative communists maintain an uncritical position towards the Soviet 
experience and generally exhibit a traditional, highly hierarchical organisational 
model. It is the case of the democratic centralism that characterises the 
Portuguese Communist Party. The reformed communist left is more open to 
New Left stances, in particular ecology, pacifism and democratic participation. 
It is the case of the Italian Party of Communist Refoundation.
24
 
In March’s analysis, democratic socialist parties refer to those 
formations defining themselves in opposition both to the totalitarian communist 
experience and to modern social democracy. In the aftermath of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and, more specifically, in a context of a right-turn among many 
historical social democratic parties
25
 – tantamount to the full endorsement of 
neoliberal principles - democratic socialist parties are those parties positioned 
themselves to the left of the mainstream social-democrats. The group of the 
democratic socialists is characterized by a combination of socialist economic 
positions, the rejection of neoliberal policies coupled with the defence of the 
state’s role in the economy) and several new left issues (i.e. stances in favour of 
ethnic minorities, environmentalism and participatory democracy). Within this 
type it is possible to quote examples such as: the “Nordic Green Left”, far-left 
parties in Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
The last two groups identified by March are the populist socialist and 
the social populist parties. According to March, the populist socialist parties are 
a subgroup of democratic socialist parties rather than a real and autonomous 
type. Populist socialists share the ideological core of the democratic socialist 
parties. They exhibit socialist identity grafted with numerous new left issues. 
However, in opposition to the democratic socialists, they have a more eclectic 
ideological portrayal. Not only do they include traditional left-wing issues on 
their agenda, but also, they lay strong emphasis on identity a, coupled with anti-
establishment and anti-elites appeals.
26
 
The last group identified by March refers to social populist parties. The 
parties included in this category resemble the Latin America populist 
movements. Their main characteristics are: weak party organisations, 
charismatic leadership and incoherent ideology. Their programmes mingle left-
wing and right-wing issues in line with their strong anti-establishment appeal.
27
  
On this ground, it is possible to proceed with the explanations provided 
by the literature for the electoral success/failure of the different parties included 
in this wide category of far-left and focus on demand-side and supply-side factors. 
 
 
                                               
23  Ibidem. 
24  Ibidem. 
25  Ibidem. 
26  Ibidem. 
27  Ibidem. 
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Explaining Electoral Success: the Demand Side and the 
Supply Side. 
 
Far-left parties are not only a heterogeneous family with different 
ideological portrayals and different intensities of radicalism or extremism, their 
electoral performances are very different also. In this part, I intend to map those 
factors identified as major determinants of their electoral results.
28
 I shall 
distinguish between the demand-side and the supply-side factors. The demand-
side factors focus on socio-economic and cultural aspects such as the 
unemployment rate, gender, education, etc. Supply-side explanation, instead, 
concentrate on the political opportunity offered by the political systems (i.e. 
party organisation, communication strategies, alliances, etc.). Clearly, this 
cannot be a full review of the elements that are supposed to determine the 
success of far-left parties. The recent development of the literature on far-left 
parties necessarily implies the possibility of excluding some relevant factors.
29
 
Furthermore, not all parties have the same objectives, thus maximization of the 
electoral support cannot be considered as the main goal for all far-left parties.
30
 
In other words, not all the demand-side or supply-side factors can be useful in 
understanding the dynamics of the electoral results. Considering this caveat, I 
shall proceed with a brief review of the main determinants identified by the 
literature. The basic assumption is that the understanding of what these factors 
are about and how they interact among them might provide a more accurate 
analysis of the far-left parties in contemporary Europe, why they register 
relevant successes in certain countries and why they fail to mobilise in others.  
 
The demand-side factors 
 
Political scientists often use demand-side factors as an explanation of a 
party’s electoral success. These include those socio-economic factors that can 
make far-left parties more appealing for the electorate. In this analysis I shall 
                                               
28  Luke March and Charlotte Rommerskirchen, Out of left field? … cit. 
29  Ibidem. 
30  Following the literature, there are three different ideal-typical goals to which parties can 
aim: winning the election or maximizing the electoral support (vote goals), implementing 
their identity (policy goals) and maximizing political power (office seeking goals). So, 
Vote-goals are not necessarily the first goals to which a party can aspire. Wolfgang C. 
Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western 
Europe Make Hard Decisions, London, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Kaare Strøm, 
“A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Parties”, American Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 34, 1990, pp. 565-598. 
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focus on economic grievances, modernization grievances, attitudes towards the 
European Union (EU) and party age. 
The first group of determinants on the demand-side refers to the 
economy. Several social scientists related party electoral success to economic 
grievances, and this in particular in times of economic scarcity. The underlying 
assumption is that at the basis of politics there is a competition among social 
groups with opposing material interests and clashing interests with regard to the 
limited available resources.
31
 In the past, arguments based on economic 
grievances have been used to explain the electoral success of far-left parties.
32
 
Scholars often rely on two different indicators in order to assess the role of 
economy on electoral behaviour: the unemployment rate and the GDP rate. 
These two indicators, even if extremely important, seem to be insufficient in 
order to understand the way economic conditions have shaped the electoral 
dynamics of far-left parties. It is important to note that far-left parties often 
advocate for more equality and for increased state intervention. Therefore, it 
might be interesting to analyse how indicators such as income inequality, the 
structure of the labour market or the degree of public intervention can influence 
their electoral success.
33
  
The grievances related to a modernization crisis are one of the most 
traditional factors used to explain the electoral success of a party family. In 
recent years this factor has prevalently been linked to the success of far-right 
parties and new right populist parties.
34
 However, in some cases, the 
modernization crisis has been connected to the success of far-left parties also.
35
 
The assumption behind is that changes in society related to the process of 
modernisation can create new cleavages or even change old ones. This 
reorganisation can be translated into a mobilisation for new political issues and, 
more specifically, an opposition to the old establishment.
36
 To this point, 
                                               
31  1Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Martin Paldam, “Economic Voting: An Introduction”, 
Electoral Studies, vol. 19, 2000, pp. 113-121. 
32  1Stefano Bartolini, The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Benjamin T. Bowyer and Mark I. Vail, 
“Economic Insecurity, the Social Market Economy, and Support for the German Left”, 
West European politics, vol. 34, no. 4, 2011, pp. 683-705. 
33  1Luke March and Charlotte Rommerskirchen, Out of left field? … cit. 
34  1Piero Ignazi, “The silent counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme 
right-wing parties in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 22, 1992, 
pp. 3–34; Paul Taggart, “New populist parties in Western Europe”, West European 
Politics, vol. 18, 1995, pp. 34–51. 
35  1Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit. 
36  1Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right Populism in Western Europe, New York, St Martin’s 
Press, 1994; Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann, The Radical Right in Western 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995; 
Michael Minkenberg, “The renewal of the radical right: Between modernity and 
antimodernity”, Government and Opposition, vol. 35, 2000, pp. 170–188. 
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Inglehart
37
 argues that the transition to a post-modern society produces a so-
called “silent revolution”, linked to a radical transformation of citizens’ values. 
Mainstream materialistic values prioritizing citizens’ materialist needs clash 
with the diffusion of post-materialistic values prioritizing individual freedom, 
environmentalism and gender equality. This process has been associated to the 
emergence of Green parties, which, at their origins, had a strong anti-
establishment position. It is also the case of left libertarian parties.
38
 However, 
the effects on the far-left seem to be uncertain. On the one hand, not all far-left 
parties can be connected to new issues and/or an emerging cleavage. Several 
far-left parties are still enrooted in the communist tradition, with a strong 
Marxist ideological programme and low or absent references to the new left 
agenda. On the other hand, strong orthodox communist parties are now quite 
rare and most of the far-left parties in Western Europe have become open to the 
new left issues. All in all, it can be extremely rewarding to understand how 
modernization grievances factors have influenced the development of 
democratic socialist and social populist far-left parties, those two sub-groups 
which share weaker linkages to the communist ideology and privileged instead 
an anti-establishment position. 
The attitude towards the EU is another important issue that can 
influence the success of far-left parties. Some of these parties have shown an 
extremely critical stand toward the European integration process. The far-left 
parties’ stances on the E.U. are various and heterogeneous; some of them aim at 
a radical withdrawal from the E.U., while some others promote a radical reform 
of the E.U. institutions from within the European context.
39
 However, all these 
parties endorse a radical reform of the E.U. and feature among the parties 
regularly framed as euro-sceptic.
40
 Indeed, different analyses have underlined 
that radical and extreme parties on both left and right side of the political 
spectrum are among the most Eurosceptic voices in Europe. Yet it is not clear if 
a strong Eurosceptic position privileges the far-right vis-a-vis the far-left.
41
 As 
in the case of far-right parties, far-left parties have used criticisms towards the 
E.U. as a marker of identity, an opposition to “mainstream” politics, especially 
their differences with regard to the social democratic and centre-left parties. 
However, far-left Euroscepticism is clearly different form the far-right one. If 
far-left parties are Eurosceptic in the name of their national identity and national 
                                               
37  Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among 
Western Publics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 
38  Herbert Kitschelt, “Left-libertarian parties: explaining innovation in competitive party 
systems”, World Politics, vol. 50, 1988, pp. 194–234. 
39  Richard Dunphy, Contesting Capitalism? … cit. 
40  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit.; Luke March and Charlotte 
Rommerskirchen, Out of left field? … cit. 
41 Catherine E. de Vries and Erica E. Edwards, “Taking Europe to its extremes: Extremist 
parties and public Euroscepticism”, Party Politics, vol. 15, 2009, pp. 5–28. 
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sovereignty, far-left parties justify their Eurosceptic stances in the name of the 
opposition to the neoliberal market agenda.  
According to the literature, another element that is supposed to 
influence the electoral success of a party is its historical support in the past.
42
 A 
party electoral results are directly or indirectly influenced by the performance in 
past elections. According to this line of analysis, the higher the consensus of a 
party has been historically, the more likely it is to obtain good results in recent 
elections. Several long-lasting cultural and political mobilisers can provide an 
electoral advantage in the long run.
43
 Some far-left parties are long-standing 
organisations founded during the early years of Nineteen centuries, so they can 
be influenced in their electoral results by their party age. More specifically, this 
variable refers to the duration of their presence on the ground and the intensity 
of the socialisation.
44
 
 
The supply-side factors 
 
The previous overview has illustrated that the literature recognizes that 
a wide range of demand-side factors can determine the electoral success – and 
implicitly the failures – of the far-left group of parties. However, most studies 
acknowledge (jointly or in isolation from the demand-side) the relevance of the 
supply-side factors. As in the case of the group of radical right parties, this 
focus is explained by a basic observation: factors connected to economic 
grievances, modernization challenges or legacies do no vary enough across 
cases or even within cases in order to (fully) account for differences in far-left 
support. Consequently, the literature emphasised the importance of having a 
favourable supply-side either in terms of individual party strategy or the 
structure of party competition, without neglecting the institutional arena. As in 
the case of the demand side factors, the benchmark remains the literature on far-
right parties. Scholars belonging to this area of research agree on the need to 
identify within the macro-category of supply-side factors a distinction between 
“internal supply-side” and “external supply-side” elements.45 Internal supply-
side elements refer to those factors that are linked to the agency at the party 
level, to the dynamics of their internal life. In this area, scholars focus on 
aspects such as party strategy, the relevance of a particular charismatic 
                                               
42  Amir Abedi, “Challenges to established parties: The effects of party system features on 
the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties”, European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 41, 2002 pp. 551–583. 
43  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit. 
44  Ibidem. 
45  Pippa Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005; Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe … cit. 
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leadership, etc. When it comes to external supply-side factors, scholars refer to 
meso-level aspects such as political and institutional settings, party-system 
opportunities, the existence of institutional incentives (i.e. party laws), etc. With 
regard to the topic of interest of this article, scholars tend to concentrate on the 
external dimension of the supply-side factors. The reasons behind are linked to 
the easier access to data and increased comparability. Although several scholars 
emphasised the importance of internal factors in understanding the success of 
far-left parties,
46
 most of the literature examines the external supply side factors. 
More specifically, two main dimensions are taken into account: the political 
opportunity structures and the parties’ organisations. 
The political opportunity structure is generally defined in reference to 
the exogenous elements that induce a system to be more or less open to political 
(individual or collective) entrepreneurship. More specifically, it refers to the set 
of institutions that shape the dynamics of the political competition.
47
 Note that 
the degree of openness of a political system is considered to be an important 
factor that can lead to the electoral success of a party. Several aspects can be 
connected to the composition of the political opportunity structure (e.g.  the 
electoral laws, the degree of (dis)proportionality, the unitary or federal 
institutional setting, the structure of party competition). On this ground, the 
electoral laws are considered to be elements of major relevance. The impact of 
the electoral law in structuring countries’ political opportunities has been a 
consensual element in the literature since the 1950s. According to Maurice 
Duverger’s famous laws,48 new and small parties are penalised in non-
permissive electoral system by both mechanical and psychological effects of the 
electoral laws. From a mechanical point of view, the higher the 
disproportionality of a system, the more difficult for new and small parties is to 
enter/remain in the system. This mechanical effect impacts upon a 
psychological effect according to which the electorate strategically adapts to the 
degree of disproportionality. More specifically, a voter is incentivized to cast a 
strategic preference and choose one of the major parties.
49
 Different scholars 
fine-tuned the initial Duverger’s laws and, with regard to the group of the far-
left parties, have illustrated that a proportional system has a slight effect on the 
success of far-left parties.
50
 Furthermore, there is increasing new empirical 
evidence that far left parties can overcome both the mechanical and 
                                               
46  Manès Weisskircher, “The Electoral Success of the Radical Left: Explaining the Least Likely 
Case of the Communist Party in Graz”, Government and Opposition, 2017, pp. 1-22. 
47  Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics., 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
48  Maurice Duverger, M. Les partis politiques, Paris, A. Colin, 1951. 
49  Gary Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
50  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit. 
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psychological effects of disproportional systems, as it is the case of far-left 
parties in France and Spain. 
Another institutional factor influencing the openness of a political 
system is the presence/the dimension of the threshold of representation. While 
for part of the literature there is no strong evidence in favour of a relationship 
between threshold and the birth and success of new parties,
51
 several scholars 
illustrated the negative effects of high threshold on the electoral success of 
small parties.
52
 Note should be taken that the effect of the electoral thresholds is 
connected not only to the “legally codified dimensions” but also to its implicit 
impact (i.e. see the majoritarian effect of the Spanish proportional law). All in 
all, according to the literature, proportional systems are the most diffused 
electoral formulae in Western Europe and the role of the electoral threshold is 
increasingly acknowledged as being fundamental in assessing the openness of a 
political system. 
Another major aspect taken into account by the literature refers to the 
distribution of powers within the polity (i.e. centre vs. periphery). To this point, 
March argued that federal institutions influence positively the electoral success 
of anti-establishment parties.
53
 Moreover, a strong presence in the local 
government (regional o municipal) tends to help far-left parties to compete for 
national representation. This observation goes against previous evidences. 
Indeed, in the past, communist parties displayed better electoral performances 
in unitary states than in federal ones.
54
 Note that the March argument in favour 
of positive impact of the federal institutions is far from being consensual. 
Several scholars have argued that there is not significant evidence for this 
assumption and invited to more caution.
55
 
Several studies focused on the patterns of party competition in order to 
explain far left successes. Intuitively, it can be said that a political environment 
characterised by a low degree of competition is a more favourable for the 
affirmation of far-left parties. Following the above-mentioned considerations 
with regard to the ideological determinants, several studies linked far left 
limited success or even failure to (in)direct competition of the green parties, in 
particular on issues regarding modernization grievances and post material 
values.
56
 Similarly, the existence of strong competitors on the far-right hampers 
                                               
51  Simon Hug, “Studying the electoral success of new political parties – A methodological 
note”, Party Politics, vol.6, 2000, pp. 187–197. 
52 Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit.; Müller-Rommel, F.  ‘Explaining the 
electoral success of green parties: A cross-national analysis’, Environmental Politics, 7, 
1998, pp. 145–154. 
53  Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe … cit. 
54  Ibidem. 
55  Ibidem. 
56  Richard Dunphy, Contesting Capitalism? … cit. 
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far-left success. Both groups compete for protest voters and advocate against 
the establishment and the mainstream politics.
57
  
Considering the shared origins and, at least partially, the ideological 
goals, the far left most direct competitors comes from the centre-left and/or 
social-democratic parties. Far-left parties traditionally competed with social-
democratic for popular support.
58
 Intuitively, the weaker the social democratic 
party, the higher the chances for a far-left party to compete for political 
relevance. In recent years, several scholars have argued that the social 
democrats’ neoliberal stances increased the space of manoeuvre for far-left 
parties.
59
 How the neoliberal position of left parties helps far-left is, however, 
not easy to assess.
60
 
The government’s political colour is an additional factor, which is 
supposed to impact upon the far-left. When a right-wing government is in 
power, centre-left parties can more easily exploit dissent and disappointment. In 
this case, far-left retrench on anti-establishment stances. When a centre-left 
party/coalition is in power, far-left parties tend to exploit the disappointment 
against the government and mobilise voters attracted by a social-economic 
agenda.
61
 However, in their research on the far-left, March and 
Rommerskirchen argued that far-left parties seem to better mobilize the protest 
against a right-wing government than when a leftist coalition is in power.
62
 
Once again, the evidence is mixed and the literature pinpoints to contradictory 
interpretations. In parallel, the literature on extremist and radical parties found 
empirical evidence in favour of the positive effect of the convergence of 
mainstream parties towards the centre. This convergence facilitates smaller 
parties to mobilize the protest against the establishment and politics as usual.
63
 
However, other researchers
64
 found no significant impact on far-left parties. 
Once again, we believe further inquiry is needed.  
Moreover, most of the literature on party electoral success focused on 
the external supply side factors and on political opportunity structures. 
However, in line with the traditional assumption, party politics is first and 
foremost about party organisation. As widely analysed by the literature, party 
                                               
57  Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe … cit. 
58  R. Neal Tannahill, The Communist Parties of Western Europe: A Comparative Study, 
Westport, Greenwood, 1978. 
59  Benjamin T. Bowyer and Mark I. Vail, Economic Insecurity … cit. 
60  Clearly, the weakness and the neoliberal position of social democratic parties are two 
different factors. One party can be strong and neoliberal or weak and non-neoliberal at the 
same time. 
61  Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Left-libertarian parties: explaining innovation in competitive party 
systems”, World Politics, vol. 50, 1988, pp. 194–234. 
62  Luke March and Charlotte Rommerskirchen, Out of left field? … cit. 
63  Pippa Norris, Radical Right: … cit. 
64  Ibidem. 
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organisational strength depends on the number of activists, local branches and 
their capacity of mobilisation.
65
 A strong network of local branches and high 
numbers of activists become an asset for local politics and useful tool for party 
central leadership. Beyond the general knowledge, there are relatively few 
comparative studies on how the far-left is organised. Based on the limited 
comparative evidence, far left parties go back to their social roots and 
increasingly invest in a strong relationship with society.
66
 Numerous far left 
parties involved activists and even voters in their internal life. Far left also 
reinforced the (in)formal relationship with social groups, civic committees and 
movements.
67
 The many ideological faces of the far-left explain the variety of 
organisational models. In the European context, orthodox communist parties 
tend to have different organizational models than democratic socialist or social 
populist. And different organizational structures or different environmental and 
participatory linkages can become an important factor in understanding the 
electoral success of far-left parties. 
Clearly, there are numerous, complex and intertwined supply-side factors 
that can influence the electoral success of a party. The literature on other party 
families, in particular the far-right ones, can be useful, because some of these 
factors can be relevant for far-left party family too. Factors like a charismatic 
leadership, the role of the media, a party’s strategy and ideology can be important 
factors in determining the electoral fortune of the far-left party family. 
 
The interaction between the supply-side and the demand-side 
 
The theoretical literature has focused on how both the demand-side and 
the supply-side can be important in determining the electoral success of a far-
left party. However, a single party’s electoral fortune is not related only to the 
                                               
65  Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize: 
Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London, Sage, 
1994. 
66  Thomas Poguntke, “Parties without ﬁrm social roots? Party organizational linkage”, in 
Kurt Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Political Parties in the New Europe: 
Political and Analytical Challenges, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 43–62; 
Susan E. Scarrow, “Political activism and party members”, in Russell J. Dalton and Hans‐
Dieter Klingemann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 636–654. 
67  Thomas Poguntke, “Political parties and other organizations”, in Richard S Katz and 
William J Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, London, Sage, 2006, pp. 396 –405; 
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Radical Left Parties in Southern Europe”, South European Society and Politics, vol. 18, 
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effect of demand-side and supply-side factors. Interactions between these 
factors are important to assess. Single factors can influence the party 
performance both in positive and negative way, but it is out of the interaction 
among factors together that parties make their success or failure. Factors like 
economic grievances create a favourable context for far-left parties. A good 
party strategy or an open structure of the opportunity trigger the far-left 
electoral success. 
Nonetheless, the group of far-left parties is very heterogeneous. 
Understanding how the interaction between the supply-side and the demand-
side influence the electoral success of far-left parties can be particularly useful 
in understanding different electoral results across time and space. A fruitful 
example is provided by the electoral fortune of far-left parties in “Southern 
Europe”. Italy, Spain, and to a lesser extent Portugal, share different features 
with regard to their political environment. In all the three cases, similar 
demand-side and supply-side factors are present.
68
 Still, the extent of the far-left 
electoral success differs, in particular after the 2008 general elections. In 
synthesis, the Italian far-left has obtained much lower results compared to its 
Spanish and Portuguese counterparts.
69
 This explain the case selection for the 
following in-depth analysis.  
 
 
Far-left Parties in Italy, Spain and Portugal 
 
The Italian, Spanish or Portuguese social-economic contexts are rather 
similar and, on paper, particularly fertile for a far-left positive development. 
Yet, if we take into account the electoral results (Figure 1), far-left parties 
perform rather differently. In the remaining of the article, I shall illustrate why 
and how the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side factors is 
the most successful strategy of inquiry in this field (See Figure 1). 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the electoral results of the Spanish, 
Portuguese and Italian far left parties followed a similar path, at least for a 
while. From 1989 until the beginning of the economic crisis in 2007/2008, far-
left parties have been stable elements in the political and parliamentary system. 
They benefitted from a relatively high share of votes. A partial exception was 
Portugal where the far-left parties remained fringe parties, with a limited 
electoral success. In the post-2008 period, the paths diversify. In line with the 
                                               
68  For a summary of the demand-side and supply-side factors in contemporary Europe, Luke 
March Contemporary Far-left Parties in Europe from Marxism to the Mainstream?,  
Friederich Ebert Stiftung 2008. 
69  Marco Damiani, La sinistra radicale in Europa, Roma, Donzelli, 2014; Marco Lisi, “U-
Turn: The Portuguese Radical Left from Marginality to Government Support”, South 
European Society and Politics, vol. 21, 2016, pp., 541-560. 
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literature, Spain, Italy and Portugal were supposed to provide equally 
favourable contexts for the development of far-left parties. This scenario is 
clearly defined by March.
70
 Back to 2008, March identified ten factors (with 
regard to both of demand and supply-side)
71
 in favour of his thesis. These 
positive elements were connected to socioeconomic grievances (i.e. high 
unemployment rates, losses of GDP), modernization and EU-focused 
grievances (i.e. diffused anxiety with regard to globalisation and increased 
dissatisfaction with both EU and national democracy), and, last but not least, 
with the openness of the political system (i.e. the absence of main competitors 
like the greens or far-right parties).  
More in-depth, March assessed how many among the 10 dimensions 
were present in each European country on a period from 1990 to 2008. 
According to his analysis, in Spain and Italy figured six out of the ten factors, 
Portugal totalizing only four. On this ground, according to March, the Italian 
and Spanish socio-political environments were considered to be among the most 
favourable for the development of the far-left. Only Germany and Finland 
scored higher. Portugal appeared to be the case with the lowest number of 
factors positively connected to the far left. However, a simple glance to the 
aggregated figure from fig. 1 tells a rather different story. Spain and Italy far 
left parties have the lowest electoral result. In Italy, far-left parties registered the 
lowest electoral results at the 2008 general election. For the first time in the 
post-WWII period, they were excluded from the parliamentary representation.
72
 
Understanding these differences can be explained in terms of the interaction 
between the country-specific demand and the supply-side factors.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, both in Italy and Spain there is a significant 
discontinuity in the far-left electoral success, in particular starting with the 
2011/2012 elections, the peak of the economic crisis and the launching of 
austerity measures. For the sake of clarity, the economic crisis refers to a period 
of economic retrenchment, with losses in terms of GDP coupled with increasing 
unemployment rates. At a EU-28 level, the effects of the economic crisis were 
extremely harsh in all the three countries under scrutiny. In the middle of the 
economic crisis (2009-2015), the unemployment rate was of 26% in Spain, 16% 
in Portugal and 13% in Italy. On average, each country had lost 2% of its 
GDP.
73
 However, while in Spain and Portugal, far left registers an electoral 
                                               
70  Luke March, Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe … cit. 
71  The factors identified by March are: pre-existing far-left parties, federalism/devolution, 
convergent party system, high unemployment, low GDP growth, low satisfaction with 
national democracy, low EU support, high globalisation anxiety, no significant green 
party and no significant right party. 
72  Marco Damiani, La sinistra radicale in Europa ... cit. 
73  Source: www.oecd.org 
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growth, with significant differences between the two countries, in Italy far-left 
parties vote shares remained low.  (See Table 1). 
In order to explain the differences, I have updated the 10 dimensions used 
by March in his research, covering the period from 2009 to 2010. The data gathered 
in Table 1 does not pinpoint to any relevant differences with regard to the supply-
side and demand-side.
74
 We believe, explanations are to be found elsewhere. 
Although the crisis impacted upon relevant demand side factors (i.e. 
economic grievances in terms of high unemployment and the attitude toward 
globalisation), in the three countries the socio-political environment din not 
radically change. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence (Figure 1) indicates 
important changes. The main change is found in Spain with the breakthrough of 
Podemos at the 2016 general election. A new party, Podemos initially defined 
itself as beyond right and left and only recently assumed a radical left 
movement identity.
75
 In Portugal far-left parties have progressively increased 
their vote shares since the 1990s. The distribution of votes among the different 
parties changed significantly. At the 2015 general election the Left Bloc (Bloco 
de Ezquierda, BE), a radical-left formation founded in 1999, obtained much 
more votes than the traditional far-left coalition, the Unitary Democratic 
Coalition (CDU) formed by the Portuguese Communist Party and the Ecologist 
Party (10,20% for the BE and 8,20% for the CDU).
76
 Against the initial 
forecasts, Spain and Portugal behaved similarly. In both countries, far-left 
parties reached a relevant percentage of electoral mobilisation. In both 
countries, this mobilisation went in favour of non-traditional parties, although 
rather different parties if one considers the origins, the content and the results of 
Podemos and the Portuguese Left Bloc. In both cases, part of the explanation is 
connected to the organizational patterns and the strong relations with social 
movements. These supply-side elements provided the parties with an important 
advantage in the electoral competition.
77
 
Despite March’s expectations, Italy behaves in a rather unexpected 
way. After the 2008 general elections, no far-left party has entered Parliament. 
Both at the 2013 and 2018 general elections, the far-left reached less than 5 % 
                                               
74  I considered high unemployment when the mean annual unemployment was under 8 %, 
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of votes, much less than in the other countries. In this case it can be asserted 
that to a favourable socio-political environment (a high presence of demand-
side determinants) did not correspond to an adequate supply. Although further 
inquiry is needed, it seems that the parties’ strategy and organisations were not 
suitable to intercept the diffused support. Moreover, the Italian far left suffered 
from the competition of others political forces, such as that of the Movement 
Five Stars.
78
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Far-left parties do not seem as a retreating army anymore as they are 
present in almost all European political systems, often with a relevant presence 
in parliament, and, in some cases, even in government. In recent years, scholars 
have also shown a renewed interest in analysing far-left parties. Still, the topic 
remains peripheral if compared to other lines of research, in particular to the 
literature on the far right. Drawing on the relatively limited literature available, 
this contribution aimed to provide an updated overview of the far-left 
characteristics and determinants of success. If before the fall of the Berlin Wall 
the most successful far-left parties in Europe had been communist parties, after 
the fall of the USSR, the far-left ideological features changed significantly. 
Beside the traditional communist parties, new types of far-left parties emerged 
(i.e. democratic socialist or far-left populist parties). 
Drawing upon the literature used to explain the electoral success of far-
right parties, the literature on the far left took into account both the demand and 
supply-side in order to explain the different electoral evolutions. On this 
ground, this analysis considered that, beyond mapping the demand and supply-
side factors, it is extremely important to analyse the interaction between them. It 
is only in this perspective that it is possible to understand how the patterns of 
interaction in a specific context can lead to success or failure in a political 
system.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
78  In the 2013 Italian general elections two forces presented candidates, The Left Ecology 
and Freedom (Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà) and the coalition Civil Revolution; in the 2018 
general elections there were two different forces, the coalition Free and Equals (Liberi e 
Uguali, formed by Left Ecology and Freedom and Article One, some dissidents of the 
Democratic Party, and Power to the People), Marco Damiani, La sinistra radicale in 
Europa … cit. 
What’s Left? Far-left Parties Changing in Contemporary Europe 611 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII no. 4  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 
 
 
Figure 1. The electoral success of far-left parties in Italy, Spain and Portugal 1990-2018 
Note: In this figure are considered those far-left parties, which reached at least 2% of the vote 
share in at least one general election. 
Source: www.parties-and-elections.eu (Accessed 5 December 2018). 
 
Table 1. The political environment of far-left parties in Spain, Italy and Portugal 2009-2018 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Luke March, Contemporary far-left parties in 
Europe, … cit. 
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Factors Spain Italy Portugal
Historical legacy + + +
Convergent party system - + -
High decentralised system + - -
No significant green party + + +
No significant right party + - +
Low GDP rate - + +
High Unemployment + + -
Low European support - + -
High globalisation anxiety - + +
Low satisfaction with national democracy - + -
SUM 5 8 5
